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"DOUBTS ABOUT OUR PROCESSES":
RICHARD D. SIMONS AND THE
JURISPRUDENCE OF RESTRAINT IN STATE
CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS

David E. McCraw*

In one of his last major writings on state constitutional
analysis, Judge Richard D. Simons of the New York State Court
of Appeals set forth plainly the constitutional issue that most
consumed him during his fourteen year tenure on the court:
As Judge Kaye notes [in her majority opinion], neither the Court
nor its individual Judges have consistently followed any
announced standards for departing from Federal law to adopt a
different State rule or settled on any preferred methodology for
doing so (but see, People v. P.J. Video, 68 N.Y.2d 296, 501
N.E.2d 556, 508 N.Y.S.2d 907 [(1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
1091 (1987)]).... Indeed, the Court recently has appeared to
shy away from establishing any standards and, without guidance
from us, parties have been free in cases asserting both Federal
and State constitutional claims to rely on the general equities of
the case, to appeal to the subjective views of the individual
Judges on what the rule ought to be and to urge adoption of the
methodology best suited to arrive at the desired result.
Hopefully we will, in time, achieve an articulable consensus on
how these matters should be handled. 1
* David E. McCraw is an associate at the law firm of Rogers & Wells in
New York City. From 1992 through 1994, he served as a law clerk to Judge
Simons at the Court of Appeals.

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 1997

1

614

Touro Law Review, Vol. 13, No. 3 [1997], Art. 4

TOURO LAW REVIEW

[Vol 13

To review Judge Simons' state constitutional writing is to
return time and again to that issue and, more particularly, to a
single theme: the court needs to find uniform standards and
methodologies if it is to ensure that its state constitutional
decision-making is orderly and institutional, not erratic and

personal.

It is, in some ways, a curious legacy for a judge,

seemingly focused as it is on the esoterica of process and
jurisprudence rather than the heartland of substantive law -- on
how and whether state constitutional analysis should be
undertaken rather than on what results it should spawn. Indeed,

though state constitutional interpretation has been perhaps the
single most divisive issue in the modern history of the court of
appeals 2 and Judge Simons was at the center of the debate, his

disagreement was rarely with the outcome of the case and almost
always with the process of getting there. In his six most
significant writings on the interplay between the state and federal

constitutions, there are three concurrences,
3

three majority

opinions, and no dissents.
Yet for all of its discussion of process and decision-making,

Judge Simons' constitutional writing was not merely about the
mechanics of the court and its business, but instead arose from
1. Immuno AG v. Moor-Jankowski, 77 N.Y.2d 235, 262 n.2, 567
N.E.2d 1270, 1286 n.2, 566 N.Y.S.2d 906, 922 n.2 (Simons. J., concurring),

cert. denied, 500 U.S. 954 (1991).
2. See Luke Bierman, Horizontal Pressures and Vertical Tensions: State
Constitutional Discordancy at the New York Court of Appeals, 12 ToURo L.
REV. 633 (1996).
3. See People v. Bigelow, 66 N.Y.2d 417, 488 N.E.2d 451, 497
N.Y.S.2d 630 (1985); People v. P.J. Video, Inc., 68 N.Y.2d 296, 501 N.E.2d

556, 508 N.Y.S.2d 907 (1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1091 (1987);
Patchogue-Medford Congress of Teachers v. Board of Educ., 70 N.Y.2d 57,
71, 510 N.E.2d 325, 331, 517 N.Y.S.2d 456, 463 (1987) (Simons, J.,
concurring); Town of Islip v. Caviglia, 73 N.Y.2d 544, 540 N.E.2d 215, 542
N.Y.S.2d 139 (1989); People v. Vilardi, 76 N.Y.2d 67, 78, 555 N.E.2d 915,
921, 556 N.Y.S.2d 518, 524 (1990) (Simons, J., concurring); Immuno, 77
N.Y.2d at 257, 567 N.E.2d at 1282, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 918 (Simons, J.,
concurring); People v. Harris, 77 N.Y.2d 434, 570 N.E.2d 1051, 568
N.Y.S.2d 702 (1991).
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and articulated his views on two bedrock issues of jurisprudence:
first, the proper role of state courts in a dual-sovereign, dualconstitution system and, second, the way in which courts attain
and preserve institutional legitimacy over time and through
changes in their membership. What emerges from a close
reading of Judge Simons' opinions is a consistent belief that
while the court undeniably has the freedom to use the state
constitution to act independently of the United States Supreme
Court and the Federal Constitution, it is a freedom that should be
used sparingly and reluctantly, only as a last resort when a
principled reason compels the court to do so. His concern, in
essence, was that the state constitution could too easily become
the forbidden fruit of a state's highest court: the alluring
temptation to conjure up new law at will, freed from the normal
restraints of precedent, legislative reversal, and appellate review.
As Judge Simons bluntly stated in one concurrence:
[t]he majority merely finds arguments rejected by the [U.S.
Supreme Court] more persuasive than those adopted by the
court. That is within its power but a disagreement with the
highest court in the land based solely on a preference for another
rule when the provisions of the two Constitutions read the same
raises doubts about our processes and creates instability and
uncertainty in our law. 4
THE SEARCH FOR AN ANALYTICAL
METHODOLOGY
Judge Simons' tenure at the court, from January 1983 to
December 1996, coincided with the emergence of state
constitutional analysis as a nationwide phenomenon. In what
scholars have labeled the "new judicial federalism," state high
courts over the past two decades have regularly looked to their
own state constitutions to find greater protection of personal

4. Vilardi, 76 N.Y.2d at 86. 555 N.E.2d at 926, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 529.
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liberty than that afforded by the Federal Constitution. 5 While
frequently the state courts' "discovery" of their own constitutions
came as a direct response to conservative rulings by the postWarren Supreme Court, New York has had a longer history of
independent constitutional decision-making.6 Nonetheless, the
period of Judge Simons' term stands as a high water mark for
state constitutional adjudication in New York, most notably in the
areas of free expression, search and seizure, and the rights of the
accused.
Judge Simons' first opinion rejecting a federal constitutional
decision in favor of a higher state standard came in People v.
Bigelow,7 a decision that stands in stark contrast to his later
writings. In Bigelow, police officers had conducted a search
believing they had a valid warrant. In fact, probable cause had
not been legally established before the magistrate. Under the
Supreme Court precedent, United States v. Leon, 8 suppression of
evidence from the search would not have been required so long
as the police acted in good faith. The New York Court of
Appeals, however, decided to suppress the evidence on state
constitutional grounds, criticizing Leon as providing an incentive
for lawless police acts. 9
What makes Bigelow exceptional in retrospect is the
perfunctory analysis of Judge Simons' majority opinion. Leon is
disposed of and the alternate state rule established in a single
paragraph without so much as a passing reference to the
particular state constitutional section at issue. 10 The rationale for
rejecting Leon points to no unique New York cases,
circumstances, or history, but instead finds the federal rule
unacceptable on public policy grounds. None of the restraining

5. G. Alan Tarr, Constitutional Theory and State Constitutional
Interpretation,22 RUTGERS L.J. 841 (1991).
6. Vincent M. Bonventre, State Constitutionalism in New York: A NonReactive Tradition, 2 EMERGING ISSUES ST. CONST. L. 31 (1989).
7. 66 N.Y.2d 417, 488 N.E.2d 451, 497 N.Y.S.2d 630 (1985).
8. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
9. 66 N.Y.2d at 427, 488 N.E.2d at 458, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 637.
10. Id.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol13/iss3/4

4

1997]

McCraw:
"Doubts
About Our Processes"
"DOUBTSABOUT
OUR
PROCESSES"

analytical framework that would mark Judge Simons' later
decisions is to be found.
THE P.J. VIDEO APPROACH

That changed dramatically less than a year later in People v.
P.J. Video, Inc. 11 As in Bigelow, the court in P.J. Video found
a search warrant application invalid as a matter of state law even
though it had met the federal constitutional standard for probable
cause. More significant than its substantive holding is the
decision's lengthy discussion of state constitutional analysis.
Writing for the majority, Judge Simons for the first time
attempted to set out an analytical framework for determining
whether the state constitution affords greater protection than the
Federal Constitution. His plain intention was to create a scheme
that could be used irrespective of the right in question, not solely
in the context of search and seizure cases.
P.J. Video posits two bases for finding a deviation between
similar provisions in the Federal Constitution and state
"noninterpretive
review" and
"interpretive
constitution:
12
The former applies when the language of the two
review."
constitutions differ. In undertaking an interpretive review, a
court should consider:
(a) whether the state constitution expressly recognizes a right
not found in the similar federal provision;
(b) whether the language of the state constitution is "sufficiently
unique to support a broader interpretation of the individual
right;"
(c) whether the history of the state constitutional text reveals the
drafters' intention to exceed the federal standard or to be
coextensive with it, and
11. 68 N.Y.2d 296, 501 N.E.2d 556, 508 N.Y.S.2d 907.
12. Id. at 302-03, 501 N.E.2d at 560, 508 N.Y.S.2d at 911.
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(d) whether the "very structure and purpose" of the state
constitution can be viewed as affirming certain rights and not
merely restraining the state's power. 13
A noninterpretive analysis is called for, on the other hand,
when the state and federal provisions are textually
indistinguishable. Despite the similarity in language, a higher
state standard may be warranted, according to P.J. Video, as a
' 14
matter of "sound policy, justice and fundamental fairness."
Among the factors to be considered by the court are:
(a) how state statutory and common law has defined the scope
of the right;
(b) the degree to which the State has historically or traditionally
protected the right;
(c) whether the state constitution has identified the right as one
of "peculiar State or local concern"; and
(d) whether there exist "distinct attitudes of the State citizenry
toward the definition, scope or protection of the individual
right." 15

In finding the search and seizure in P.J. Video unconstitutional
as a matter of state law, the court employed the newly articulated
noninterpretive prong of the framework. Even as it broke new
ground, the analysis in the case was prototypical of Judge
Simons' emerging philosophy of judicial restraint in state
constitutional interpretation -- most specifically, the need to find
concrete, articulable reasons in New York precedents, statutes,
or history to adopt a rule that differed from the federal rule. In
P.J. Video, a magistrate had determined that there was probable
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol13/iss3/4
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cause to suspect that defendants were selling obscene materials
based on a warrant application that contained only the officer's
itemized list of the sexual acts depicted. 16 This was insufficient,
the court of appeals explained, because under the state's penal
code, offensive, explicit depictions of sexual conduct are not
obscene unless they appeal only to the prurient interest when
17
considered as a whole and judged by community standards.
Put directly, an itemized list of depicted acts gave the magistrate
no basis for determining whether probable cause existed as to
these other statutory elements of the crime. The court, in
approving of the warrant application, concluded that because the
federal constitutional standard ignored parts of the New York
statutory scheme, a higher state standard was required. 18
But putting the outcome aside, the interpretive/noninterpretive
framework set forth in P.J. Video was unprecedented. No prior
New York decision had attempted to articulate a coherent scheme
for undertaking independent state constitutional review: not a
single New York case is cited to support any aspect of the
framework. The principal source for the scheme is, in fact, an
article in University of Texas Law Review by Earl M. Maltz. a
professor at Rutgers School of Law. 19 While P.J. Video itself is
barren of any discussion of why a comprehensive analytical
framework of any sort was needed, the Maltz article is telling.
At a time when most scholars were unabashedly enthusiastic in
their support for expansive use of state constitutions to depart
from federal precedents, Professor Maltz struck a discordant note
of concern. He concluded:
[T]he additional layer of noninterpretive review is of
questionable value. For the most part, that layer will merely
duplicate already existing federal review, while decreasing the

16. Id. at 300-01, 501 N.E.2d at 559, 508 N.Y.S.2d at 910.
17. Id. at 308, 501 N.E.2d at 564, 508 N.Y.S.2d at 915.
18. P.J. Video, 68 N.Y.2d at 308, 501 N.E.2d at 564. 508 N.Y.S.2d at
915.

19. Earl M. Maltz, The Dark Side of State Court Activism. 63 TEX. L.

REv. 995 (1985).
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ability of local legislatures to respond to changing conditions 2and
0
increasing uncertainty about the scope of constitutional rights.

AFTER P.J. VIDEO
While that skepticism about state constitutional analysis was
left unspoken in Judge Simons' opinion in P.J. Video, it would
become obvious in his later writings as he attempted over the
next decade to institutionalize in the court's jurisprudence the
interpretive/noninterpretive analysis spelled out in P.J. Video. In
his 1990 concurrence in People v. Vilardi, a case involving the
prosecutor's obligation to turn over exculpatory material to the
defense, Judge Simons complained that the majority decided to
adopt a rule at odds with federal constitutional law simply
because it disagreed with the United States Supreme Court. 2 1 By
failing to give serious attention to the P.J. Video analysis, which
by then had been incorporated into other court of appeals
decisions, 22 the majority "raise[d] doubts" about the court's
processes and created instability and uncertainty in the law, in
Judge Simons' view. 23
The Vilardi concurrence made explicit the point suggested
implicitly in P.J. Video: that there should be specific, articulable
reasons in New York precedents, statutes, or history for adopting
a state constitutional interpretation that diverges from the federal
Constitution. Judge Simons asserted that the court had been
willing to depart from the United States Supreme Court's
decisions in only three kinds of situations: (1) when the Supreme
Court has retreated from its own prior rulings or had established
a rule that was at odds with New York law; (2) when New York
20. Id. at 1023.
21. Vilardi, 76 N.Y.2d at 84, 555 N.E.2d at 924, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 52729.
22. See, e.g., People v. Kohl, 72 N.Y.2d 191, 197, 527 N.E.2d 1182,
1185, 532 N.Y.S.2d 45, 48 (1988); People v. Alvarez, 70 N.Y.2d 375, 37879, 515 N.E.2d 898, 899, 521 N.Y.S.2d 212, 213-14 (1987).
23. Vilardi, 76 N.Y.2d at 86, 555 N.E.2d at 926, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 529.
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common law in a particular area had been fully developed and the
court of appeals decided to constitutionalize it; and (3) when
there were "concerns peculiar to New York State residents" that
dictated an independent New York rule. 24 In each of those
instances, there was a concrete, precedent-based reason,
extending beyond the judicial preferences of the current members
of the bench, for moving in a different direction from the
Supreme Court.
The textbook example of the court's application of that
principle is Judge Simons' majority opinion in People v.
Harris.25 Harris raised the issue of whether the defendant's
confession to police at the stationhouse should have been
suppressed because he had been arrested an hour earlier in his
home without a warrant. In 1988, the court of appeals had
suppressed the confession as the fruit of the illegal arrest on
federal grounds, only to be reversed by the United States
Supreme Court. 2 6 On remand, the court of appeals once again

voted to suppress, this time on state constitutional grounds. The
critical factor for Judge Simons was the presence of specific,
unique New York law that was incompatible with the federal
holding of the Supreme Court.
Specifically, the Supreme Court had concluded that suppression
would have little deterrent effect on the type of illegal police
behavior involved. The Court reasoned that because probable
cause existed and the suspect could legally have been arrested
outside his home, the officers' failure to obtain a warrant had a
tenuous connection to their desire to secure a confession. 27 In
rejecting that reasoning on remand, the court of appeals relied
upon a significant distinction between New York and federal law.
Under federal law, the right to counsel did not necessarily attach
at the issuance of an arrest warrant; in New York, it did. Thus.
a suspect could not be questioned under New York law without
24. Id. at 83, 555 N.E.2d at 924, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 527.
25. 77 N.Y.2d 434, 570 N.E.2d 1051, 568 N.Y.S.2d 702.

26. See People v. Harris, 72 N.Y.2d 614, 532 N.E.2d 1229. 536
N.Y.S.2d 1 (1988), rev'd, 495 U.S. 14 (1989).
27. Harris, 77 N.Y.2d at 436-37, 570 N.E.2d at 1052. 568 N.Y.S.2d at
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counsel present once a warrant was issued. 28 In practice, then,
while police had little reason under the federal rules to forgo a
warrant in hopes of obtaining a confession, the incentive to do so
was much greater under the New York rules. Thus, the court of
appeals concluded, the suppression would deter illegal police
29
conduct, and an independent state rule was justified.
Ironically, the most expansive and controversial discussion of
Judge Simons' philosophy of judicial restraint came in a decision
that he did not write. In 1992, in two companion cases involving
30
search and seizure issues, People v. Scott and People v. Keta,
the court, which had long been known for its collegiality, divided
bitterly and publicly over the majority's decision to reject federal
precedents and decide the cases under the New York constitution.
More notable than the outcomes -- the majority ordered
suppression in both instances -- was the internal battle over state
constitutional analysis. Judge Bellacosa, in a dissent joined by
Judge Simons and former Chief Judge Wachtler, blasted the
majority for "supplanting" the court's noninterpretive method of
analysis. 3 1 Relying largely on Judge Simons's decisions in P.J.
Video and the Harris remand, Judge Bellacosa argued that the
majority had failed to provide the "sufficient reason" required by
those decisions to depart from the United States Supreme Court's
holdings. 32 He criticized the majority for failing to take into
account the need for "some disciplined analytical method to
provide precedential guidance and to justify the desired outcome
by reasoned articulation. "33 Without that disciplined method, the
dissent asserted, the court "in effect creates a new echelon of
state constitutional analysis which may be deployed whenever any
future majority of this Court simply chooses to differ with a

28. 77 N.Y.2d at 439-40, 570 N.E.2d at 1054, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 705.
29. Id. at 440-41, 570 N.E.2d at 1055, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 706.
30. 79 N.Y.2d 474, 593 N.E.2d 1328, 583 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1992).
31. Id. at 506, 593 N.E.2d at 1348, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 940 (Bellacosa, J.,
dissenting).
32. Id. at 509-10, 593 N.E.2d at 1350-51, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 942-43.
33. Id. at 511, 593 N.E.2d at 1351, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 943.
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particular United States Supreme Court decision and
34
interpretation. "
The concurring opinion by Judge Kaye took issue both with the
tone and conclusions of the dissent and, ultimately, with its
methodological assertions. Judge Kaye wrote:
First, however much we might consider ourselves dispensing
justice strictly according to formula, at some point the decisions
we make must come down judgments as to whether a particular
protection is adequate or sufficient ....

Second, I disagree with the dissent that, in an evolving field of
constitutional rights, a methodology must stand as an ironclad
checklist to be rigidly applied on pain of being accused of lack of
principle or lack of adherence to stare decisis.... [Wihere we
conclude that the Supreme Court has changed course and diluted
constitutional principles, I cannot agree that we act improperly in
discharging our responsibility to support the State Constitution
a matter of
when we examine whether we should follow along as
35
checklist.
the
on
fall
may
State law - wherever that
While Scott and Keta indisputably set forth the positions in the
methodological debate, the place of P.J. Video methodology in
the court's jurisprudence remains unclear. Though P.J. Video
and its progeny were never formally rejected or limited. Judge
Simons later conceded that the court had not settled on a uniform
36
methodology for guiding its state constitutional interpretations.
Tellingly, in doing so he did not specifically advocate a
reaffirmance of the P.J. Video framework, but rather called on
the court to adopt some methodology -- whatever it may be - to

bring order its constitutional decision-making.

34. Id. at 513, 593 N.E.2d at 1353, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 945.

35. Id. at 504, 593 N.E.2d at 1347, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 939 tKaye. J.,
concurring).
36. Imnmno, 77 N.Y.2d at 263 n. 2. 567 N.E.2d 1270. 1286 n. 2. 566

N.Y.S.2d 906, 922 n. 2 (Simons, J., concurring).
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THE "FEDERAL FLOOR" AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRAINT

The second half of Judge Simons' philosophy of restraint
centers not on the how of state constitutional analysis, but on the
when and whether. Beginning in 1987 with a concurrence in
Patchogue-Medford Congress of Teachers v. Board of
Education,37 Judge Simons advocated that the court of appeals
refrain from deciding any issue as a matter of state constitutional
law unless and until it was certain that the relief sought was not
available as a matter of federal constitutional law. At issue was
perhaps the most significant procedural issue raised by the new
judicial federalism: whether a state constitutional ruling should be
rendered when relief under the Federal Constitution is available.
The question most clearly arises when the extent of federal
protection for a right is uncertain, and the court of appeals is
disposed to find that the state constitution affords protection in
any event. Should only the state question be resolved by the
court, thereby bringing the litigation to an end, irrespective of
federal law? Or should the court of appeals render a federal law
opinion first and, if favorable to the party asserting protection of
a right, make no state finding unless the Supreme Court reverses
and remands? Or, alternatively, should both federal and state
law decisions be rendered -- the so-called "dual" approach?

Consistent with his view that the state constitution should be
approached with judicial restraint, Judge Simons saw the court's
first duty as participating in the interpretation and determination
of federal law. His view flowed from the basic precept that the
United States Constitution created, in the words of Justice
Brennan, a "federal floor" of protection below which the states
could not go, but above which they were free to create enhanced
individual rights. 3 8 "That being so," Judge Simons wrote in
Patchogue-Medford, "it would seem desirable, for the sake of
37. 70 N.Y.2d at 71, 510 N.E.2d at 331, 517 N.Y.S.2d at 463.
38. Id. at 72, 510 N.E.2d at 332, 517 N.Y.S.2d at 463-64.
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uniformity, that we first determine that 'floor' when we are asked
39
to do so."

It was not until four years later, in Imniuno AG v. MoorJankowski, that he gave fuller expression to that view and made
plain that more than a concern for uniformity is at stake.
Immuno, besides being one of the court's most important free
speech decisions, brought into sharp focus the divisions within
the court over the proper interplay between federal and state
constitutional analyses.
At issue in linmuno was whether certain statements in a letter
to the editor could be construed as assertions of fact and therefore
actionable in a defamation suit. The court had earlier ruled in
favor of the defendant, but the matter was then remanded by the
United States Supreme Court for reconsideration following its
decision in Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co.40 While the New
York Court of Appeals was unanimous on remand in again
finding for the defendant, the decision spawned three
concurrences, principally on the issue of whether state law,
federal law, or both should provide the basis for the outcome. In
her opinion for the court, Judge Kaye embraced the dual
approach, analyzing the issue under both the federal and state
constitutions, and concluding that the defendant should prevail
under both. 4 1 Judge Titone contended that state law alone should

be employed. 4 2 Judges Simons and Hancock. in separate
concurrences, advocated that the case be resolved solely on
43
federal grounds.

39. Id., 510 N.E.2d at 332, 517 N.Y.S.2d at 464.

40. The procedural history is summarized in Judge Kaye's majority
opinion. See 77 N.Y.2d at 239-40, 567 N.E.2d at 1271-72. 566 N.Y.S.2d at
907-08. See also, Milkovich, 497 U.S. 1 (1990).

41. For Judge Kaye's brief summary of the various views expressed by the
court, see Inumuw, 77 N.Y.2d at 256 n.6, 567 N.E.2d at 1282 n.b. 566
N.Y.S.2d at 918 n.6.

42. Id. at 263, 567 N.E.2d at 1286, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 922 (Titone, J.,
concurring).
43. Id. at 257, 567 N.E.2d at 1282, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 918 (Simons. J.,
concurring); id. at 268, 567 N.E.2d at 1290, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 926 (Hancock.

J.. concurring).
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Judge Simons' concurrence in Immuno revisited PatchogueMedford's "federal floor" theme and articulated new and broader
concerns about the need for judicial restraint by a state's highest
court as a matter of appropriate federalism. Judge Simons'
opinion begins by acknowledging that the court's primary role is
to address and determine New York state law, but he says other
considerations must be weighed as well:
When the Court reviews a question of Federal constitutional
law ... it acts as part of a larger judicial system embracing not
only New York but the Nation as a whole. When Federal
questions are presented, its institutional functions are
subordinated to the Supreme Court and it acts, in effect, as an
44
intermediate Court.
It follows from that, Judge Simons asserted, that the Supreme
Court should have the opportunity to review pronouncements on
federal law, consistent with its ultimate responsibility for
determining federal law. 45 That becomes impossible under the
dual-constitution approach taken by the court in Immuno, Judge
Simons points out. While the decision interpreted federal law, it
then fully and finally decided the matter on independent state
grounds that are unreviewable by a federal court, thus preventing
Supreme Court review of the federal interpretation. 4 6
Conversely, by finding in favor of the defendant on state grounds
after first fully deciding in his favor on federal grounds, the
court's state law determination becomes unnecessary dicta and
violates the first principle of judicial restraint, i.e., that a court
should decide no more than necessary to resolve the dispute
presented. 4 7 In sum, Judge Simons said, the natural growth and
evolution of law through appellate review was frustrated when,
as a matter of procedure, rightful appellate review was denied
and the precedential effect of the court's decisions was rendered
uncertain.
44. Id. at 260-61; 567 N.E.2d at 1285; 566 N.Y.S.2d at 921.

45. Id.
46. Id. at 261, 567 N.E.2d at 1285, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 921.

47. Id.
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Judge Simons' concurrence acknowledged the practical
problems posed for litigants by his "federal floor" approach.
Defendants might come before the court of appeals and prevail on
federal grounds, only to lose before the United States Supreme
Court. They would then have to undergo a second and possibly
protracted round of appellate practice in the state courts to
determine the very same claim on state constitutional grounds.
Those concerns were particularly profound in Immuno, which
had already been before the court once and involved events
dating back nearly eight years. Nonetheless. Judge Simons
wrote, concerns about judicial economy are present in every
case, and they "rarely justify overriding established rules of
judicial restraint." 48 The larger and dispositive concern, in Judge
Simons' view, was to assure the orderly operation of the
appellate process, or, as he put it, to maintain "our institutional
responsibility to provide stability and certainty in the
49
development of law."
Interestingly, in two later decisions that he wrote for the full
court, Judge Simons employed his "federal floor" approach,
although neither case rekindled the debate of hnmuno or directly
addressed dualism. In a free speech case that came before the
court shortly after hnmuno and involved similar issues. Judge
Simons rested his unanimous opinion on federal constitutional
law, although the opinion acknowledges that the same result
would arise under state law as a result of Imnzuno. 50 "No useful
purpose would be served in articulating the differences between
the two approaches when the defendant is able to prevail under
the narrower Federal test," he wrote for the court. 5 1 Similarly.
in Lee 7T v. Dowling, which voided state procedures used to
compile a register of persons accused of child abuse, the court
relied solely on federal due process grounds and declined to

48. Id. at 263, 567 N.E.2d at 1286, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 922.

49. Id.
50. 600 West 115th Street Corp. v. Von Gutfeld, 80 N.Y.2d 130, 145.
603 N.E.2d 930, 938, 589 N.Y.S.2d 825, 833 (1992).
51. Id.
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52
consider petitioners' companion state constitutional argument.
In contrast to the court's Immuno methodology, the Lee 7T court
held: "Inasmuch as we conclude that the relief petitioners
requested is warranted under Federal constitutional principles, we
have no occasion to consider whether the Due Process Clause of
the State Constitution guarantees even broader protection. "53

BEHIND THE JURISPRUDENCE OF RESTRAINT

Given his strong preference for narrowly focused, closely
reasoned opinions, it is not surprising that none of Judge Simons'
writings fully explores the deeper question posed by his state
constitutional jurisprudence: why should the court of appeals
have a heightened concern about judicial restraint in approaching
the state's own constitution? After all, it is the court's highest
duty to determine New York law, and the court's right to
interpret the state constitution is unassailable. Moreover, the
constitution is a powerful tool for shaping law at the court of
appeals. No further appeal lies for all practical purposes, no
statute can reverse the decision, and the issues raised and decided
fundamentally shape the lives of New York citizens. As such, it
represents one of the court's greatest opportunities to influence
law and policy. At the same time, the document itself is a
cornerstone in the federal scheme envisioned by the Federal
Constitution, and a vital, evolving state constitution would seem
to be critical to meaningful federalism.
A close reading of Judge Simons' opinions makes clear that
none of those points has been lost. As decisions like P.J. Video
and Harris demonstrate, he was willing to turn to the state
constitution and use it in groundbreaking ways when he discerned
that the law and circumstances warranted. But it is also clear that
he harbored a deep concern that the state constitution could be
52. Lee TT v. Dowling, 87 N.Y.2d 699, 713, 664 N.E.2d 1243, 1252-53,
642 N.Y.S.2d 181, 190-91 (1996).
53. Id.
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misused as a tool of arbitrary judicial fiat unless the court,
through its decision-making processes, was willing to exercise an
appropriate degree of self-restraint.
In part, that view reflects a broader philosophy of judging that
marked Judge Simons' writing, whether about constitutional,
common law, or statutory issues. He believed that courts should
decide the cases before them, nothing more and nothing less, and
should do so on the basis of law and not personal preference or
ideological disagreement. His view of the law was not naive; he
understood that judging was, in the end, a human undertaking
subject to the normal human frailties. But he believed that the
decisional process itself -- for example, adherence to precedent,
stare decisis, and jurisdictional doctrines such as preservation and
reviewability -- if abided by, legitimized a court's authority,
made its decisions institutional and sustaining, and prevented
misapplication of the judicial power.
As much as those general considerations are present throughout
his opinions, one senses in Judge Simons' writings a heightened
concern for the issue of judicial restraint in state constitutional
analysis. It is not difficult to speculate on why that might be so.
The state constitution differs from both the Federal Constitution
and the common law in ways that are central to the decisional
process and the restraint it imposes. There are comparatively
few precedents for many of the state constitutional questions and
significantly less scholarship to illuminate the text. The state
constitution has little tradition of analysis to which a court can
turn to find general principles of construction.
And it is
frequently called upon by litigants, not because there is any
colorable argument based on prior interpretations of the relevant
provision, but solely because the litigant disagrees with the
federal precedents and wants a second bite of the constitutional
apple. In significant ways, the state constitution is a largely
blank slate, free of the decisional process restraints that impose
limits on the court in other areas. At the same time, the court's
interpretations of the state constitution are not subject to the usual
sources of accountability, specifically, appellate review and
legislative reversal.
In short, the power of the court is
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unparalleled and the normal restraints are largely absent when it
turns to the state constitution.
But Judge Simons' concern, it seems, was not that the court
would use that expansive power to render improvident decisions.
Instead, he was addressing a more fundamental institutional
concern: that even worthy decisions, to the extent they appear to
be merely the personal preferences of the judges who happen to
be on the bench at that time and subject to change when new
judges come along, undermine the court's legitimacy in the eyes
of litigants, the bar, and the public at large. These "doubts about
our processes" 54 say nothing about the wisdom of any particular
decision, but instead speak to whether the court as an institution
acts in a manner that preserves the respect and authority that it
needs in order to be not merely powerful, but legitimate as well.
It is safe to say that, at Judge Simons' retirement, the issues of
uniform methodology and constitutional dualism remain
unresolved for the court of appeals. However, irrespective of
whether his views ultimately prevail, his sustaining contribution
to the court, and to the development of state constitutional law,
will be his clear and principled insistence that the court pay heed
to the issue of institutional integrity as it broke new constitutional
ground. As his decisions suggest, the long-term impact of the
revolution in state constitutional law may ultimately, and
ironically, depend on how well the court safeguards some of its
most venerable traditions.

54. See supra notes 5 and 23 and related text.
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